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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the growing support for the idea that problem drug use should be 
treated like a chronic medical disease,1 some law enforcement interest groups, 
including trial court judges associations, prosecuting attorneys associations, and 
police associations (“law enforcement groups” or “criminal justice actors”), 
continue to argue for the use of the criminal justice system to address the 
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 1 See, e.g., Taleed El-Sabawi, Defining the Opioid Epidemic: Congress, Pressure 
Groups, and Problem Definition, 48 U. MEM. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2018).  
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nation’s drug crises.2 The justification for the use of the criminal justice system 
to oversee the psychological and medical treatment of persons with substance 
use disorders (SUDs) is based on the belief that persons with SUDs are deviants, 
who cannot refrain from engaging in sinful behavior.3 Therefore, punishment, 
or the threat thereof, is needed to deter the deviants’ immoral conduct and to 
ensure that the deviants comply with treatment.4 Law enforcement groups have 
also argued that incarceration is an effective method to “dry out” someone 
suffering from a SUD, through a forced detox, thereby encouraging entry into 
treatment.5  
The empirical evidence that supports the efficacy of coerced and 
compulsory treatment is underwhelming, at best, and ineffective, at worst.6 
Furthermore, treatment outcomes for persons with SUDs enrolled in substance 
abuse treatment without the threat of incarceration are equal to, if not superior 
than, those under supervision of the criminal justice system.7 Those entering 
treatment through means independent of the criminal justice system have the 
additional benefits of not suffering the stigma that results from a criminal 
 
 2 See, e.g., Prescription Drug and Heroin Abuse Issues Before the H. Energy and 
Commerce Comm. and the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 114th Cong. 
(2015) (statement of Victor Fitz, Cass County, Michigan Prosecutor & President, 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/  
IF02/20150326/103254/HHRG-114-IF02-Wstate-FitzV-20150326.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/2STG-49BF] [hereinafter Prescription Drug and Heroin Abuse Issues]; Press Release, 
Statement from the Chambers of the Chief Justice, Maureen O’Connor, The Hidden Disaster 
of State Issue 1 (Aug. 28, 2018), http://ohiopa.org/oconnor1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
PMM2-MHLT]; Press Release, Statement from OSBA President Robin Weaver: Ohio State 
Bar Association Opposes State Issue 1 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.ohiobar.org/about-
us/media-center/osba-news/statements/statement-from-osba-president-robin-weaver-
ohio-state-bar-association-opposes-state-issue-1/ [https://perma.cc/5EDJ-9HSM] 
[hereinafter OSBA Statement]; Press Release, Statement of the Ohio Common Pleas Judges 
Association regarding Ohio Issue One (Aug. 14, 2018), https://moritzlaw.osu.edu/depc/ 
wp-content/uploads/sites/115/2018/08/Ohio-Common-Pleas-Judges-Association-
media-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UQE-5X43]; State Issue 1: A Safe Harbor for Drug 
Traffickers and Violent Offenders, OHIO PROSECUTING ATT’YS ASS’N (2018), 
http://ohiopa.org/noon1.html [https://perma.cc/2KVV-XTEK] [hereinafter Safe 
Harbor].  
 3 See generally EDWIN M. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 3–7 (1965) (for an 
overview of the historic use of the deviancy narrative and the purported justifications for its 
use). 
 4 See generally Rebecca Tiger, Drug Courts and the Logic of Coerced Treatment, 26 
SOC. F. 169 (2011). 
 5 See id. at 174–75; see also Prescription Drug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note 
2. 
 6 Dan Werb et al., The Effectiveness of Compulsory Drug Treatment: A Systematic 
Review, 28 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 1, 7–8 (2016). 
 7 See id. 
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record8 and do not incur the additional taxpayer dollars spent paying for the 
requisite law enforcement oversight.9 
Despite the empirical literature, some law enforcement groups continue to 
make statements, underscored with assured certainty, that the threat of 
incarceration is a necessary tool to treat SUDs and to address the nation’s current 
opioid crisis.10 For example, in response to a 2018 Ohio Ballot Issue proposing 
a decrease in criminal penalties for simple possession and reallocating dollars 
saved to treatment services,11 the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio 
wrote in the Supreme Court’s official position statement,  
Drug courts would be impeded by taking jail time off the table. We know, 
through multiple studies, that drug courts are effective only when they combine 
the “carrot” of treatment and support with the “stick” of judicial accountability, 
including incarceration when needed. It is this carrot-and-stick approach that 
enables judges and drug court teams to use a variety of tools to help people 
overcome addiction. But Issue 1, while providing a lot of carrots by expanding 
treatment, takes away the stick. . . . We are talking about Ohio becoming, in 
effect, unable by its constitution to offer drug court participation and to 
incentivize that involvement by the “carrot” of not having a felony conviction 
record. Who would want to participate in a drug court program knowing that 
they only face probation for possession of fentanyl, cocaine, 
methamphetamine, K2, heroin, and so forth?12 
 
 8 See Jordan Blair Woods, A Decade After Drug Decriminalization: What Can the 
United States Learn from the Portuguese Model?, 15 U. D.C. L. REV. 1, 24 (2011). 
 9 KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICS OF SIN 249 (1994).  
 10 See, e.g., Press Release, Buckeye State Sheriffs’ Ass’n, Sheriffs Blast Issue 1: 
Irresponsible for Ohio (Sept. 19, 2018), http://www.ohiojudges.org/Document.ashx? 
DocGuid=389edd01-7fc2-43b1-871e-109a367905a0 [https://perma.cc/A73H-QZBL]. 
 11 Amendment stated as follows: 
If adopted, the amendment would . . . [in part] [m]andate that criminal offenses of 
obtaining, possessing, or using any drug such as fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine, 
cocaine, LSD, and other controlled substances cannot be classified as a felony, but only 
a misdemeanor. Prohibit jail time as a sentence for obtaining, possessing, or using such 
drugs until an individual’s third offense within 24 months. Allow an individual 
convicted of obtaining, possessing, or using any such drug prior to the effective date of 
the amendment to ask a court to reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor, regardless of 
whether the individual has completed the sentence. Require any available funding, 
based on projected savings, to be applied to state-administered rehabilitation programs 
and crime victim funds. Require a graduated series of responses, such as community 
service, drug treatment, or jail time, for minor, non-criminal probation violations. 
Ohio Issue 1, Proposed Constitutional Amendment, “To Reduce Penalties for Crimes of 
Obtaining, Possessing, and Using Illegal Drugs” (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.sos.state 
.oh.us/globalassets/ballotboard/2018/2018-11_issue1_certifiedballotlanguage.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/77RV-ZCBH].  
 12 O’Connor, supra note 2. 
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Ohio’s Chief Justice’s narrative was echoed by statements from the Ohio 
State Bar Association,13 the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association,14 the Ohio 
Common Pleas Judges Association,15 the Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio,16 
the Ohio Chief Probation Officers Association,17 the Ohio Association of Chiefs 
of Police,18 and the Buckeye State Sheriffs’ Association.19 
Stances such as those by these law enforcement groups in Ohio are not 
unique to state laws and politics; local prosecuting attorneys associations and 
 
 13 President Weaver stated as follows:  
We firmly believe that treatment and rehabilitation are the right strategies for 
curbing Ohio’s opiate crisis and have seen them working in drug courts around the 
state. However, when you categorically strip our judges of their discretion and take 
away an important tool—the threat of prison time—you significantly lower the chances 
that they will get sober, enroll in and complete a drug treatment program. 
OSBA Statement, supra note 2. 
 14 Safe Harbor, supra note 2 (“Research and experience clearly demonstrate that 
without court intervention, including possible incarceration, addicts are less likely to seek 
treatment. The amendment will cost some addicts their lives.”).  
 15 Ohio Common Pleas Judges Association, supra note 2 (“Loved ones of drug 
dependent individuals will lose their last chance to help their addict get clean in the criminal 
justice system.”). 
 16 Gary Wolske, FOP of Ohio Opposes Issue 1, FRATERNAL ORD. POLICE OHIO (Sept. 
24, 2018), https://www.fopohio.org/index.cfm?zone=/unionactive/view_article.cfm&
homeID=726163 [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]. 
 17 Veronica M. Perry, OCPOA President stated:  
I think we all agree that we have a health epidemic on our hands and treatment is more 
appropriate than incarceration for individuals who suffer from [substance use 
disorder] . . . [however], the measure incorrectly assumes that there is an infrastructure 
in place to handle the onslaught of people that would enter the court system. . . . This 
approach not only minimizes a judge’s ability to sanction after repeated offenses and 
violations, but it seriously hinders a probation officer’s effectiveness in compelling 
treatment for individuals who may be lacking the motivation to seek help for 
themselves. 
Letter from Veronica M. Perry, President, Ohio Chief Prob. Officers Ass’n, 
http://www.ohiojudges.org/Document.ashx?DocGuid=20a86127-337e-401a-a194-
082eb2069273 [https://perma.cc/MV3U-98GF]. 
 18 OACP named the following five ways in which it would impact Ohioans: (1) 
undermine treatment efforts; (2) hinder the ability to prosecute drug traffickers; (3) reduce 
sentences of violent offenders; (4) overburden local governments, and; (5) imply to young 
individuals that drug abuse and addiction is not serious. Letter from Jeffrey Scott, President, 
Ohio Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, OACP Issue 1 Opinion (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://oacp.org/oacp-issue-1-opinion/ [https://perma.cc/2SND-WND2]. OACP further 
noted that the proposal would hinder the ways in which drug courts were providing 
alternative treatment methods to individuals. Id. 
 19 See Press Release, Buckeye State Sheriffs’ Ass’n, supra note 10 for a statement in 
which the Buckeye State Sheriffs’ Association emphasized the need for law enforcement to 
get traffickers off the streets, noting that the proposed amendment would cost law 
enforcement significant amounts of money, would fuel drug trafficking, and lead to many 
more deaths in the community. 
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other law enforcement agencies testifying at congressional hearings on the 
opioid crisis have similarly argued for the need of the “stick” of incarceration to 
address the opioid crisis.20 Law enforcement groups’ support for the stick is not 
surprising in light of their historic efforts to support the use of punishment to 
addressing problem drug use.21  
The use of the “carrots-and-sticks” narrative is part of law enforcement 
groups’ broader commitment to support a criminal justice approach to 
addressing the nation’s drug problem—an approach defined by the use of the 
criminal justice system to deter bad behavior through the threat of punishment.22 
In my previous analysis of congressional hearing testimony preceding the 
enactment of federal legislation to address the opioid crisis, I found that despite 
the dominance of the idea that problem drug use is a public health issue, law 
enforcement groups continued to emphasize the need for the use of the criminal 
justice system to adequately address the opioid crisis.23 This commitment to the 
use of the criminal justice system has endured despite the international trend 
shifting away from this approach as a means of addressing problem drug use.24 
The international community has widely acknowledged that a public health 
approach incorporates best practices in substance abuse policy.25 Although 
evidence exists to suggest that the criminal justice approach to problem drug use 
may be transforming, this evolution seems to only be occurring at the margins, 
a phenomenon that I will discuss infra.  
In this Article, I explore how public law enforcement groups26 use 
narratives to define problem drug use as a criminal justice issue in the wake of 
the opioid crisis. In doing so, I explain the motivations behind law enforcement 
groups’ continued support for the criminal justice approach, despite the efforts 
to redefine problem drug use as a health issue. Using theories of interest group 
behavior, I argue that law enforcement groups’ support of the criminal justice 
approach is a result of their attempts to protect and further the interests of their 
members, attorneys, judges, and police personnel who rely heavily on state and 
 
 20 See, e.g., Prescription Drug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note 2.  
 21 See Taleed El-Sabawi, The Role of Pressure Groups and Problem Definition in 
Crafting Legislative Solutions to the Opioid Crisis, 11 NE. U.L. REV. 372, 374 (2019). 
 22 See id.  
 23 See generally El-Sabawi, supra note 1; El-Sabawi, supra note 21.  
 24 See El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 1358–59. See generally Policy and Practice 
Briefings: Prisons and the Criminal Justice System, EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & 
DRUG ADDICTION, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/print/best-practice/briefings/prisons-
and-the-criminal-justice-system_en [https://perma.cc/7FCH-SXDH] (discussing health 
intervention strategies in Europe).  
 25 See generally Policy and Practice Briefings, supra note 24. 
 26 In my analysis of federal congressional hearing testimonies from 2014–2016 on the 
opioid crisis, most, if not all, law enforcement interest groups participating publicly in the 
discourse were public, not private, for-profit actors. Similarly, the position statements of law 
enforcement groups on Ohio’s Issue 1 came from public groups. Because public law 
enforcement groups have been most active in the discourse, this Article focuses on the 
contributions that these public agencies have made to the problem definition discourse in the 
age of the opioid crisis.  
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federal budget allocations for survival. I will demonstrate that narratives 
supported by law enforcement groups in the discourse surrounding the opioid 
crisis position these criminal justice actors as “fixers”27 of the drug problem and, 
in doing so, encourage the allocation of funding and resources necessary to carry 
out their duties as problem fixers. I will further show how some law enforcement 
groups have justified their continued roles as fixers of problem drug use, but 
have done so on a spectrum, suggesting that at least some law enforcement 
groups have acknowledged the need to re-envision their perceived role in 
addressing problem drug use. 
In Part II of this Article, I provide a short overview of the relevant literature 
on pressure group behavior and narrative use in the policy process. In Part III of 
this Article, I report the findings of my empirical analysis of law enforcement 
groups’ narratives defining the opioid crisis. Although the findings are based on 
my analysis of the contemporary discourse, I also provide some historical 
context to allow the reader to better understand the ways in which narrative use 
has changed over time. In Part IV of this Article, I apply theories of interest 
group behavior to explain how law enforcement groups have used criminal 
justice themed narratives in the discourse on the opioid crisis to further the 
interests of group members. In Part V, I review the variation between law 
enforcement narrative use, focusing on the differences in the degree of law 
enforcement jurisdiction and corresponding funding. I highlight that the 
acceptance of the health-oriented approach is beginning to occur, but only at the 
margins. I close with a call for research of proposed explanations for the noted 
variations in law enforcement groups’ acceptance of a health-oriented approach. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Pressure Group Behavior 
In a pluralist majoritarian democracy, such as the United States, actors join 
together in groups to protect the interests of their constituents.28 These 
organized interest groups lobby to further the interests of their members at each 
stage of the legislative process.29 Administrative agencies are also invested in 
legislative outcomes that will increase or maintain their delegated powers, as 
well as their operational budgets.30 By engaging in lobbying efforts that include 
providing legislative testimony or communicating directly with voters in an 
effort to sway public opinion,31 both administrative agencies and organized 
 
 27 DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 224 
(3d ed. 2012).  
 28 See id. at 20–22. 
 29 See id. at 19–36. 
 30 See generally El-Sabawi, supra note 1 for an in-depth discussion of this contention. 
See also MEIER, supra note 9, at 72–76 (discussing federal drug agency budgets). 
 31 Kevin M. Leyden, Interest Group Resources and Testimony at Congressional 
Hearings, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 431, 431–39 (1995); see, e.g., STONE, supra note 27, at 28–
30. 
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interest groups pressure legislators or voters to enact legislative proposals or 
initiatives that support the interests of its group’s members.32 When doing so, 
pressure groups commonly use a rhetorical tool known as the policy narrative.33  
B. Policy Narratives 
Policy narratives, especially those describing the causes of a social problem, 
are powerful rhetorical tools used by organized interest groups to persuade 
policy actors to adopt preferred policy proposals.34 As purveyors of information 
and expertise, pressure groups are particularly well-situated to influence policy 
by strategically crafting narratives35 about what caused the policy problem and 
who or what is to be blamed.36 These policy stories classify certain actors as 
either the “bad guys”37 or the “fixers”38 of the problem, create new political 
alliances, and “either challenge or protect an existing social order.”39 Like 
fictional narratives, these policy narratives have elements including characters, 
a problem, and a solution.40 The process of crafting these narratives may be 
conscious or unconscious, and the narrating group can start by choosing either 
the characters, problem, or desired solution.41 Narrators have leeway in 
choosing the elements of their narrative and in choosing the order in which they 
construct it, but all elements of the narrative must still be believable and credible 
to the intended audience.42 Although the elements of most policy narratives are 
consistent, the order in which the story is crafted differs from narrator to 
narrator, and the decisions the narrating group makes at each of these decision 
points affects the alternatives available for the remaining story elements.43 
Consequently, policy narratives can narrow the available alternative policy 
proposals in ways that limit possible proposals to those that are desirable, 
 
 32 See El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 374–76. 
 33 Policy narratives are also referred to generally as narratives or stories. For the 
purposes of this Article, I will not distinguish between the types of policy narratives, but 
instead will use the term generally to refer to all types of stories used as forms of 
communication in the policy making process. 
 34 See, e.g., El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 1362, 1367 n.48. 
 35 Some social narrative scholars also distinguish between stories and narratives. See, 
e.g., SHAUL R. SHENHAV, ANALYZING SOCIAL NARRATIVES 20–36 (2015). For simplification 
purposes, I will refer to narratives and stories interchangeably, with the caveat that there is 
disagreement in the literature as to the differences and similarities of the two constructs. 
 36 DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 148–54 (1988).  
 37 See, e.g., El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 388–89. 
 38 See STONE, supra note 27, at 157–82, 224.  
 39 Id. at 224.  
 40 See FRANK FISCHER, REFRAMING PUBLIC POLICY: DISCURSIVE POLITICS AND 
DELIBERATIVE PRACTICES 161–64 (2003); STONE, supra note 27, at 157–82.  
 41 See El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 380–85. 
 42 See FISCHER, supra note 40, at 177–78; see also El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 1366. See 
generally SHENHAV, supra note 35.  
 43 See El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 380–85; see also STONE, supra note 27, at 206–28 
(discussing causal reasoning).  
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ensuring that the narrating group’s members benefit from the legislative 
proposals and are protected from the burdens of regulation.44  
In the discourse surrounding problem drug use, law enforcement groups 
have historically employed narratives that positioned the criminal justice system 
as the best overseer of responses to problem drug use.45 They have done so by 
defining addiction as a deviant behavior and emphasizing punishment as a 
deterrence for both drug use and drug sales.46 Although the traditional narrative 
of deviancy remains a prominent feature of the law enforcement discourse, 
variations of the deviancy narrative have surfaced as the federal legislative 
discourse shifts from supporting a criminal justice approach to the opioid crisis 
to a more health-oriented approach.47  
III. LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUPS’ NARRATIVES DEFINING THE OPIOID 
CRISIS 
In my analysis48 of federal congressional hearing testimony from 2014–
2016, preceding the enactment of the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery 
Act of 2016 (CARA),49 and position statements by law enforcement groups in 
 
 44 See generally STONE, supra note 27. 
 45 See El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 1362, 1367 n.48, 1406–07. 
 46 Id. 
 47 This is evidenced by the enactment of the following: Comprehensive Addiction and 
Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA), Pub. L. No. 114-98, § 601, 130 Stat. 695, 732 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3(b)(2)(B) (2012)); SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, H.R. 
6, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted); 21st Century Cures Act, H.R. 34, 114th Cong. (2016) 
(enacted). 
 48 To analyze the congressional hearing testimony, I used both qualitative and 
quantitative text analysis. I used QDAMiner5 for the qualitative coding and Wordstat7 for 
the quantitative analysis. I used content analysis methodology to create categories of causal 
stories and proposed solutions. Once the categories were saturated, meaning causal stories I 
identified fit into the categories created and no additional categories needed to be created, I 
identified patterns and broader themes evidenced by the categories.  
 49 I chose to analyze law enforcement groups’ federal hearing testimony prior to 
CARA’s enactment because it is a sub-analysis of a much larger project on interest group 
narratives on the opioid crisis. The corpus, or population, of documents for the parent project 
were compiled by conducting a search on Thomas Reuters Westlaw for congressional 
hearing testimony using the search terms “addict!” and “overdose!” and limiting the dates to 
hearings occurring in January 2014 to June 2016. I chose to limit the analysis to hearings 
occurring within these dates because it would capture the discourse that preceded CARA, 
which was passed in June 2016. I restricted the dataset to 2014 because of resource 
constraints. Future research will be needed to determine whether the findings of this Article 
are time‑limited. The terms “addict!” and “overdose!” were chosen because the purpose of 
my analysis is to capture the discourse on the social problem commonly referred to as the 
opioid crisis. The opioid crisis has been characterized by high rates of overdose and an 
acknowledgment of the problem of addiction. I then excluded testimony, or parts of 
testimony, that discussed methamphetamine use, synthetic drug use, and marijuana use, as 
these problems were characterized differently than the opioid crisis, a difference I hope to 
capture in a future analysis. The results were limited to hearings that occurred from 2014 to 
2016. Both written and oral testimony were included. I then supplemented these narratives 
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Ohio on “Issue 1” of a 2018 ballot initiative, I identified four categories of 
narratives that attempt to define the social problem of drug use, each of which 
is outlined separately infra.  
A. The Addict as the “Bad Guy”  
The traditional narrative that explicitly portrays the addict as a deviant is 
still supported by some law enforcement groups.50 This narrative places the 
blame on the person who uses illicit substances for fueling the drug trade and 
for causing the crime that often accompanies black markets.51 The individual 
who uses illicit substances is the “bad guy” in need of punishment, or at least 
the threat of incarceration, in order to deter his bad behavior.52 Emphasis on the 
drug users’ association with the commission of crimes is often used to justify 
the need to lock away this deviant in order to improve public safety and protect 
the public from harm.53 Some of these narratives explicitly challenge the idea 
that addiction is an illness by arguing that the person is not ill but rather a 
criminal.54 In doing so, it supports the idea that addiction should not be used as 
an excuse for criminal behavior.55 The policy proposals accompanying this 
narrative include increased criminal enforcement and the incarceration of the 
deviant drug user.56 While this narrative was by no means dominant in the law 
enforcement narratives that I reviewed, it was epitomized by lengthy testimony 
given by the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan when testifying in 
front of Congress on the opioid crisis, excerpts of which follow: 
Prosecutors, as indicated above recognize the need to hold persons 
accountable for the wide variety of crimes they commit while using these 
drugs. An addiction is not an excuse for criminal behavior. Incarceration is 
often appropriate. Dealing with a criminal case involves far more than the 
 
on federal legislation with position statements from law enforcement groups on Ohio’s Issue 
1, because (1) they provided a snapshot of narrative use on a state drug policy issue and (2) 
they addressed an instance in which the initiatives’ success would have resulted in a direct 
power (and money) transfer from the criminal justice system to the treatment system. 
 50 See sources cited supra note 2. 
 51 Drugs in Native Communities: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 114th 
Cong. (2015) (statement of Darren Cruzan, Director, Office of Justice Services, Bureau of 
Indian Affairs), https://www.doi.gov/ocl/hearings/114/dangerousdrugs_033115 [https 
://perma.cc/A6CA-B7UE] [hereinafter Drugs in Native Communities] (“The use of illicit 
drugs can lead to impaired behavior that results in violence and other criminal behavior. 
Drug traffickers often engage in violent crimes to facilitate their operations, while persons 
with substance use disorders generally engage in property crimes to support their 
addiction.”). 
 52 Prescription Drug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note 2. 
 53 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 14–19.  
 54 Id. 
 55 In fact, most law enforcement groups that acknowledged the importance of health 
responses still advocated for increased criminal enforcement alongside the health approach. 
See, e.g., Press Release, Buckeye State Sheriffs’ Ass’n, supra note 10. 
 56 See, e.g., Prescription Drug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note 2. 
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individual defendant. It also includes public safety, sending a message of 
deterrence to other offenders and the benefit that punishment also provides to 
a wrongdoer, including but not limited to drug addicts. However, prosecutors 
also recognize that if treatment can also be incorporated, the chance of 
recidivism may well be reduced. 
 
Surprising to some, rehabilitative and treatment providers often also see 
the merit to the use of criminal prosecution to teach accountability and the 
threat of incarceration as a real life, practical tool to get addicts to embrace 
treatment, rehabilitation, etc.  
 
Prosecutors, Defense attorneys and again, treatment providers also see the 
benefit of periods of incarceration to bring sobriety and a “drying out” period 
and a clear mind to drug offenders, including prescription and heroin 
offenders.57  
Using the lens of interest group power politics, the addict-as-a-deviant 
narrative names the law enforcement lobby as the primary “fixers”58 of problem 
drug use in the United States, as law enforcement agencies are experts in 
punishment. As primary fixers, these groups are in a position of power, in part 
because legislators consult with them when deciding how to address a social 
problem.59 During such consultations, these fixers are able to guide the 
discourse to their preferred legislative proposals—those that increase criminal 
enforcement and criminal penalties.60 Fixers are considered to have the power 
to describe the target population and the groups affected by the legislation and, 
in doing so, can construct their deservingness for policy benefits or burdens.61 
Finally, as the primary fixers, they would likely be the recipients of the largest 
share of federal and state budget allocation to address problem drug use, as those 
fixing the problem need money to do so.62 
As much as the addict-as-a-deviant narrative may be preferred by law 
enforcement, due in part to its depiction of law enforcement as the fixers, such 
a narrative has fallen out of favor with other pressure groups lobbying on the 
opioid crisis.63 These groups have opted for more health-oriented narratives that 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 See STONE, supra note 27, at 224. 
 59 Taleed El-Sabawi, What Motivates Legislators to Act: Problem Definition & the 
Opioid Epidemic, A Case Study, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 189, 215 (2018).  
 60 Id. at 217.  
 61 See id. at 222–25. 
 62 Id.  
 63 It appears, from my review of congressional hearing testimony preceding the 
enactment of CARA, the deviancy narrative was not dominant in the discourse amongst law 
enforcement groups’ testimony. Though common historically, such explicit vilifications of 
persons using illicit substance were outliers in the federal congressional hearing testimony 
prior to the enactment of CARA. This finding does not mean that the addict-as-a-deviant 
narrative is not the dominant discourse within the law enforcement community, but rather, 
the law enforcement groups that were invited to testify before Congress on the opioid crisis 
were primarily those that did not tell such a narrative with the same conviction as was done 
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utilize health terminology, with some groups explicitly arguing that addiction is 
a chronic disease of the brain.64 If addiction is indeed a chronic disease that 
changes brain chemistry, and not the result of inert deviance, the disease itself 
is to blame for addictive behavior.65 The addiction-as-a-disease narrative can be 
interpreted as supporting a causal theory that directly disputes the addict-as-a-
deviant narrative.66 The increasing popularity of this conflicting narrative may 
have driven some law enforcement groups to adjust the deviancy narrative or to 
develop an alternative narrative altogether. Based on my analysis, the three most 
popular adjusted or alternative narratives include: (1) the carrots-and-sticks, (2) 
the drug-traffickers-as-the-bad-guys, and (3) law enforcement as active 
participants in the health approach.  
B. Carrots and Sticks 
The carrots-and-sticks narrative is a modification of the strict addict-as-a-
deviant narrative.67 It combines the idea that those with an addiction need help 
with the idea that they cannot be helped without the threat of punishment.68  
The carrots-and-sticks narrative acknowledges that treatment may be 
effective in addressing problem drug use, but because the addict has a 
predilection for sinful or pleasurable behavior, punishment must be used as an 
incentive to correct the bad behavior and ensure compliance with treatment.69 
This coerced-treatment narrative acknowledges the need for treatment, but 
argues that due to the drug user’s weak character, treatment adherence will only 
 
previously. The composition of the law enforcement groups’ testimony does indicate, 
however, that the public tolerance for the addict-as-a-deviant narrative has decreased. This 
statement is supported not just by the prominence of health-oriented narratives, but also, in 
the types of stories the law enforcement groups that were selected to testify were telling. In 
other words, it may not be that the law enforcement lobby has abandoned the deviancy 
narrative, but that legislators invited law enforcement groups to testify that supported an 
alternative narrative. See El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 396–98.  
 64 See El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 380.  
 65 Addiction Science, NAT’L INST ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/rela 
ted-topics/addiction-science [https://perma.cc/JJG7-SDT9] (last updated July 2015) (“In 
reality, drug addiction is a complex disease, and quitting usually takes more than good 
intentions or a strong will. Drugs change the brain in ways that make quitting hard, even for 
those who want to.”). 
 66 See El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 1359–60.  
 67 Id. at 1388, 1406.  
 68 See, e.g., Prescription Drug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note 2 (quoting one 
prosecutor who states they have been more successful in getting defendants into drug 
treatment after the defendant has served jail time); O’Connor, supra note 2 (arguing “that 
drug courts are effective only when they combine the ‘carrot’ of treatment and support with 
the ‘stick’ of judicial accountability, including incarceration when needed”); Ohio Common 
Pleas Judges Association, supra note 2 (arguing that the threat of prison is what “modif[ies] 
a dependent defendant’s thinking”); OSBA Statement, supra note 2 (arguing that treatment 
is less likely and effective without “the threat of prison time”); Safe Harbor, supra note 2 
(stating that “addicts are less likely to seek treatment” without the threat of prison). 
 69 See sources cited supra note 68. 
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be achieved if the seduction of a high is combatted with the threat of 
incarceration.70 This narrative is predicated on the idea that the high of drug use 
acts as a positive reinforcement for the drug-seeking behavior by assuming that 
no other positive reinforcement will challenge that of the high. Consequently, 
the only logical response is punishment,71 like incarceration, or the use of 
negative reinforcement,72 such as releasing prisoners into treatment. The 
underlying theory is that the carrot does not work without the stick.73 
Law enforcement groups that support this narrative argue that as enforcers 
of punishment, they are in the best position to provide the punishment needed 
to ensure compliance with drug treatment. For example, Nancy Parr, City of 
Chesapeake, Virginia, Commonwealth’s Attorney, shared an anecdote during 
her testimony to demonstrate the effectiveness of carrots-and-sticks. 
C.B. was arrested in 2006 and 2007 and, in 2007, was incarcerated for 
violation of probation on an unauthorized use of a vehicle charge. At that time, 
she requested and was allowed to enter our Drug Court program. She knew and 
admitted that she was an addict, she had lost custody of her daughter and she 
“dried out” in jail. C.B. needed help and the incarceration scared her and “woke 
her up.” She experienced a couple of setbacks in Drug Court but the immediate 
sanctions reinforced the concept of consequences for all her actions and 
choices. She successfully completed and graduated in 2009. She has been clean 
since then, has regained custody of her daughter, and works full time. C.B. 
stays in contact with my office and thanks me regularly for “locking her up for 
60 days.”74 
Specialized courts, called drug courts, offer an institutionalized mechanism 
for these actors to supervise the process and ensure that persons suffering from 
problem drug use complete their treatment.75 
Setting aside arguments about the merits of the carrots-and-sticks narrative, 
the carrots-and-sticks narrative allows law enforcement actors to incorporate the 
popular, “health-oriented”76 solution of treatment, but does so in a way that 
ensures the use of the criminal justice system to oversee the treatment 
 
 70 Id. 
 71 Punishment is the addition of a negative stimuli. See generally Alan Baron & Mark 
Galizio, The Distinction Between Positive and Negative Reinforcement: Use with Care, 29 
BEHAV. ANALYST 141 (2006). 
 72 See generally id.  
 73 See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 2 (arguing that drug courts must retain the option to 
punish addicts in order to be effective). 
 74 America’s Growing Heroin Epidemic: Hearing on H.R. 953 Before the H. Subcomm. 
on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and Investigations, 114th Cong. 65–66 (2015) 
(statement of Nancy G. Parr, Commonwealth’s Attorney, City of Chesapeake, Virginia), 
https://republicans-judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/114-45_95685 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/68ZF-FMD4].  
 75 Tiger, supra note 4, at 171–73. 
 76 Throughout this Article, I use the term “health-oriented” to refer to solutions that are 
interpreted by some as health solutions and not to effectively claim that a particular type of 
solution is, indeed, a health solution. 
2019] CARROTS, STICKS, AND PROBLEM DRUG USE 777 
mechanism.77 This concession allows for some drug policy funding to be 
directed into the treatment system, but it also maintains a role for law 
enforcement groups.78 The carrots-and-sticks narrative allows law enforcement 
to address calls for increasing access to treatment but does so in a way that 
makes most likely the continued flow of funding dollars into the criminal justice 
system. Moreover, law enforcement groups maintain their role as enforcers of 
legislation governing illicit drug possession and as overseers of the treatment 
process. In sum, while the carrots-and-sticks narrative acknowledges the need 
for treatment and “tosses a carrot” to the health advocates, it simultaneously 
allows the law enforcement lobby to retain power and budget allocations.  
While this narrative may be commonplace in the discourse on state drug 
policy issues,79 it was not prevalent in the congressional hearing testimony of 
law enforcement groups on the opioid crisis between 2014 and 2016.80 The 
narrative’s popularity in Ohio’s Issue 1 discourse may have been because of 
Issue 1’s explicit mandate of the transfer of funds from the criminal justice 
system to the treatment system as a means for addressing the opioid crisis.81 
Such a transfer of funds would conceivably be accompanied by a transfer of 
power from the criminal justice system to the treatment system. The carrots-
and-sticks narrative allowed for law enforcement actors to address the call for 
treatment while maintaining the control and funding that Issue 1 sought to 
redirect. 
C. The Drug Traffickers as the Bad Guys 
An alternative narrative that appeared with more frequency at the federal 
level was the drug-traffickers-as-the-bad-guys narrative.82 Similar to the 
carrots-and-sticks narrative, the drug-traffickers-as-the-bad-guys narrative 
allows law enforcement to concede the benefits of treatment, while still 
maintaining their roles as fixers. This narrative characterizes the drug 
traffickers, instead of the drug users, as the bad guys—or the group to blame for 
causing the nation’s drug problems.83 Within the federal congressional law 
 
 77 See O’Connor, supra note 2. 
 78 See id.  
 79 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 12. 
 80 See El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 380–94.  
 81 Ohio Issue 1, supra note 11; see sources cited supra note 2.  
 82 See, e.g., Community Solutions to Breaking the Cycle of Heroin and Opioid 
Addiction: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of 
Tristram J. Coffin, United States Attorney, District of Vermont), https://www.justice 
.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/witnesses/attachments/2016/02/19/03-17-14_ 
usa_coffin_testimony_re_community_solutions_to_breaking_the_cycle_of_heroin_a
nd_opioid_addiction_web_ready.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YVW-4NZA] (discussing 
“prosecuting traffickers who seek to profit out of selling this misery”). 
 83 See, e.g., Community Solutions to Breaking the Cycle of Heroin and Opioid 
Addiction, supra note 82, at 2 (statement of Tristram J. Coffin, United States Attorney, 
District of Vermont) (describing a heroin user as a “treasured son” and the heroin dealer as 
the villain responsible for the heroin user’s death). 
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enforcement testimony, these drug traffickers were commonly described as 
doctor dealers,84 organized criminal enterprises,85 or foreign drug cartels86 that 
capitalize on persons struggling with addiction. By blaming these actors, 
 
 84 See Border Security and America’s Heroin Epidemic: The Impact of the Trafficking 
and Abuse of Heroin and Prescription Opioids in Wisconsin: Hearing Before S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 64 (2016) (statement of Timothy 
Westlake, M.D., Vice Chairman, State of Wisconsin Medical Examining Board, Chairman, 
Controlled Substance Committee), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=810511 [https:// 
perma.cc/FLN4-YXWT] [hereinafter Wisconsin Heroin Epidemic] (“[T]here are the 
prescribers that know what they are doing and intentionally profit from the prescribing—I 
see them as the ‘doctor dealers.’ . . . The ‘doctor dealers’ will and should be addressed by 
law enforcement and state medical examining boards.”); Opioid Use Among Seniors—Issues 
and Emerging Trends: Hearing Before S. Special Comm. on Aging, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) 
(statement of Sean Cavanaugh, Deputy Administrator And Director, Center For Medicare, 
Centers For Medicare & Medicaid Services), https://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/ 
doc/SCA_CMS_Cavanaugh_2_24_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LTR-NN9J] (discussing 
how “pill mills” are a term that is used by law enforcement groups in order to “describe a 
physician, clinic, or pharmacy that is prescribing or dispensing prescription opioids for non-
medical purposes, and where the prescription opioids are often diverted for sale on the illicit 
market”); America’s Heroin Epidemic at the Border: Local, State, and Federal Law 
Enforcement Efforts to Combat Illicit Narcotic Trafficking: Hearing Before S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Natalie Dawn 
Mertz, Executive Director, Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, Office of National 
Drug Control Policy), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=793249 [https://perma.cc/ 
92LY-G995] [hereinafter Heroin Addiction and Drug Trafficking] (discussing fraudulent 
prescriptions, doctors, and pain clinics and the role they play in the opioid epidemic).  
 85 See Wisconsin Heroin Epidemic, supra note 84, at 5–6 (statement of James F. Bohn, 
Executive Director Wisconsin High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program (Wisconsin 
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area), Office of National Drug Control Policy) (discussing 
Chicago and Wisconsin organized crime syndicates); see also Examination of the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy and Its Efforts to Coordinate Drug Policy Across the Federal 
Government, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of David W. Kelley, Congressional Affairs 
Liaison, National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Directors Association, Deputy 
Director, New England High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area), https://republicans-
oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Kelley-NEHIDTA-Statement-12-1 
-ONDCP.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5YU-EGL5] (“Drug trafficking organizations that prey 
upon our communities and the criminal activity associated with them can be found in every 
part of the United States.”). 
 86 See, e.g., Heroin Addiction and Drug Trafficking, supra note 84 (statement of Bill 
Montgomery, Attorney, Maricopa County); Examining the Growing Problems of 
Prescription Drug and Heroin Abuse: State and Local Perspectives: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th 
Cong. (statement of Corporal Michael Griffin, Special Investigations Division, Tulsa Police 
Department), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20150326/103254/HHRG-114 
-IF02-Wstate-GriffinM-20150326.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7KE-8EF9]; Posture 
Statement Before H. Armed Servs. Comm., 113th Cong. 7–8 (2014) (statement of General 
John F. Kelly, Commander, United States Southern Command, United States Marine Corps), 
https://defenseinnovationmarketplace.dtic.mil/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/SOUTH 
COMM_Wstate-KellyUSMCJ-20140226.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD6P-GUTG] 
[hereinafter General Kelly Statement]; Heroin Addiction and Drug Trafficking, supra note 
84 (statement of Mark J. Dannels, Sheriff, Cochise County, Arizona).  
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narrators indicate that these actors are deserving of punishment—punishment 
that should be carried out by increased or continued criminal enforcement.87 
In a variation of this narrative, some narrators explicitly differentiated 
between drug traffickers and drug users, describing drug users as victims being 
preyed upon by greedy drug traffickers.88 For example, Gary Wolske, the 
Faternal Order of Police Ohio’s President stated, “[W]e must find a way to keep 
the violent criminals and those selling drugs behind bars, while giving those in 
the throes of addiction a path to better health.”89 To provide evidence of the 
benefits of the ongoing enforcement, many of these narratives cited to statistics 
and examples of cases in which law enforcement agencies intercepted large 
quantities of drugs or prosecuted particularly nefarious drug dealers.90  
The drug-traffickers-as-the-bad-guys narrative was particularly useful to 
federal law enforcement agencies, regional law enforcement coalitions, and law 
enforcement agencies in localities that bordered Mexico.91 These law 
enforcement groups have jurisdiction over persons participating in the 
importation of illicit drugs, and by portraying foreign drug actors as the villains, 
they became the important fixers who could disrupt the networks of these 
villains by intercepting large shipments of illicit substances.92 These narratives 
established the importance of border security, interdiction, and larger-scale drug 
busts in addressing the opioid crisis.93 And, they enabled these law enforcement 
 
 87 See sources cited infra notes 90–91. 
 88 Such a distinction is not necessarily supported by empirical evidence, as often those 
who deal drugs also use them. See, e.g., Kathryn Casteel, A Crackdown on Drug Dealers Is 
Also a Crackdown on Drug Users, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 5, 2018), https://fivethirty 
eight.com/features/a-crackdown-on-drug-dealers-is-also-a-crackdown-on-drug-users/ 
[https://perma.cc/R3DC-VYEX]. 
 89 Wolske, supra note 16.  
 90 See, e.g., General Kelly Statement, supra note 86, at 3–7; Heroin Addiction and Drug 
Trafficking, supra note 84. Historically, to demonstrate the need for continued funding of 
the criminal justice approach to problem drug use, arrests of high-ranking members of drug 
cartels or large seizures of illicit drugs, and not the lay drug user or dealer arrest, has been 
used as a determinative a measure of success. See JOSEPH F. SPILLANE, Building a Drug 
Control Regime, 1919–1930, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 25, 25–59 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds., 2004) (discussing the 
historic use of statistics by law enforcement to establish the need for continued criminal 
enforcement). 
 91 See, e.g., General Kelly Statement, supra note 86, at 12–18; Wisconsin Heroin 
Epidemic, supra note 84 (statement of R. Gil Kerlikowske, Commissioner, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security), at 24. 
 92 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 91.  
 93 See The New Era in the Fight Against Methamphetamine in Iowa: Hearing Before S. 
Judiciary Comm, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Corbin Payne, Lieutenant, Tri-County 
Drug Enforcement Task Force, Waterloo, Iowa), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/ 
media/doc/10-13-15%20Payne%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/TN8L-QYAJ]; 
Drugs in Native Communities, supra note 51 (statement of Andrew C. Hanson, Special 
Agent, Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation, State of Wyoming Attorney General). 
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groups to position themselves, alongside the health actors, as integral to solving 
the opioid crisis.94  
In sum, the focus on the drug-traffickers-as-the-bad-guys and the narrative 
distinction between the drug dealer and the drug user accomplishes certain 
political objectives. First, it allows law enforcement groups to maintain the need 
for the criminal enforcement that they provide. Second, it does so in a way that 
does not challenge groups that characterize addiction as a disease or a health 
problem. It obviates the need to directly contradict popular narratives of 
addiction as a brain disease or a health issue, thereby avoiding a battle of 
narratives with members of a politically powerful health industry that supports 
these health narratives. Law enforcement groups could even partner with the 
health narrative coalition, to address public safety, while health actors increase 
access to needed substance abuse treatment. Reciprocally, if health-oriented 
actors find this law enforcement narrative credible and believable, they can 
support it without sacrificing their narrative.95 Finally, by recasting the narrative 
role of the bad guy from the drug user to the drug trafficker, these law 
enforcement groups avoid seeming out of step with national trends in public 
opinion, which show an increasing acceptance of the idea that addiction is a 
brain disease as opposed to a moral failing.96 By recasting the bad guy and 
conceding the benefits and need for treatment, these law enforcement narrators 
could accomplish their policy objectives, while potentially lowering political 
costs.  
D. Law Enforcement Groups as Active Participants in the Health 
Approach 
Some law enforcement groups embraced the definition of problem drug use 
as a health problem, citing to frustration of the tools of punishment at their 
disposal and expressing the desire to help members of their community97 in 
 
 94 Drugs in Native Communities, supra note 51. 
 95 See Legislative Proposals to Combat Drug Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Robert 
Corey Waller, M.D., M.S., Chair, Legislative Advocacy Committee, American Society of 
Addiction Medicine); see also 21st Century Cures: Incorporating the Patient Perspective: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th 
Cong. (2014) (statement of Richard F. Pops, Chief Executive Officer Alkermes, Inc.). 
 96 J. Baxter Oliphant, Prescription Drug Abuse Increasingly Seen as a Major U.S. 
Public Health Problem, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.pewresearch 
.org/fact-tank/2017/11/15/prescription-drug-abuse-increasingly-seen-as-a-major-u-s-
public-health-problem/ [https://perma.cc/N2PV-P27X] (finding that 76% of public 
believes prescription drug abuse is a very or extremely serious public health problem in the 
United States).  
 97 America’s Insatiable Demand for Drugs: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 114-722 368 (2016) (statement of Frederick 
Ryan, Chief of Police, Police Assisted Addiction Recovery Initiative (PAARI)), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=810472 [https://perma.cc/9V3E-8FQ5] (“Those 
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ways that do not involve incarceration.98 These narrators often agreed that 
addiction was a disease and that those suffering SUDs should be diverted away 
from the criminal justice system and to health actors for treatment.99 These law 
enforcement groups commonly argued that they could not “arrest [their] way 
out of the problem”100 and encouraged legislators to allocate more money for 
treatment services.101  
However, rather than espousing a health-oriented approach that appointed 
health actors as the only fixers, these law enforcement narrators created a role 
for themselves within the health-oriented approach. For some, this role included 
the provision of overdose reversal medication to overdose victims.102 For others, 
it involved delivering persons suffering from SUDs, not only to emergency 
rooms, but also to points of entry into the treatment system, where the individual 
could receive on-demand treatment.103 Other groups argued that law 
enforcement officials were best positioned to engage in prevention efforts, 
specifically in preventing youth drug initiation through education efforts.104  
 
suffering from substance use disorders are not our enemies. They are our sons, our daughters, 
[and] our neighbors . . . [a]nd, this notion that we are at war with them must be abandoned.”).  
 98 Id. at 370 (“The fact that law enforcement is recognizing this as a disease that needs 
to be treated into remission, rather than a crime that requires arrest and incarceration, has 
had a positive impact in communities throughout America.”). 
 99 Frederick Ryan stated:  
We, as law enforcement, cannot solve this problem alone—and we must stop 
telling America that, with just some more resources, we can do so. In fact, a strategy 
that relies largely on law enforcement and arrest, especially aimed at low-end users, 
only fuels the epidemic and complicates the chances for long-term recovery. 
Id. at 367. 
 100 See Jill Westmoreland Rose, Opinion, We Can’t Arrest Our Way out of Growing 
Opioid and Heroin Epidemic, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, https://www.charlotteobserver  
.com/opinion/op-ed/article103032432.html [https://perma.cc/8LNU-SD2A]; see also, 
e.g., America’s Insatiable Demand for Drugs, supra note 97, at 368 (“Every person with a 
substance abuse problem that I have talked to has said that arrest and prosecution has never 
been a deterrent.”). 
 101 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 93. 
 102 See, e.g., Deadly Synthetic Drugs: The Need to Stay Ahead of the Poison Peddlers: 
Hearing Before S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Douglas C. 
Throckmorton, M.D., Deputy Director, Regulatory Programs, Center for Drug Evaluation 
and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/ 
congressional-testimony/deadly-synthetic-drugs-need-stay-ahead-poison-peddlers 
[https://perma.cc/RBC4-6CFG].  
 103 See Attacking America’s Epidemic of Heroin and Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing 
Before S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (Statement of Enoch F. Willard, Chief 
of Police, Manchester Police Department), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/ 
doc/01-27-16%20Willard%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ3G-YL4S] (“A 24-
hour continuum of care facility will be opening in the spring, which will allow 24-hour access 
to care for anyone seeking treatment, while affording my department a more compassionate 
alternative to arrest.”). 
 104 See, e.g., Prescription Drug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note 2.  
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The narratives reviewed in this subsection share two characteristics: they 
endorse the health approach and recast law enforcement actors as coordinators 
of care or prevention specialists rather than enforcers of punishment. Despite 
being most in alignment with the dominant health-oriented narrative, the law-
enforcement-as-participants narrative was overshadowed by narratives calling 
for increased criminal enforcement.105  
The lack of popularity of the law-enforcement-as-participants narrative 
could be attributed to its potential effects on funding allocations. If law 
enforcement actors become mere participants within the health actor’s 
approach, as opposed to the architects and enforcers of their own approach, then 
they need fewer resources than previously needed for enforcement. The shift in 
responsibility could call for transfers of both power and funding away from the 
criminal justice system and to the health system to address problem drug use.106 
Such a shift, if enacted wholescale, would decrease the number of criminal 
justice personnel or the resources available to the criminal justice system as a 
whole. Such an outcome would not be in the best financial interest of law 
enforcement actors and may explain the narrative’s lack of frequency within the 
discourse. Notwithstanding its infrequency, this narrative’s mere presence in the 
discourse is noteworthy because of the degree to which it departs from historic 
law enforcement approaches to addressing problem drug use.107 
IV. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT NARRATIVE CONTINUUM 
The narratives reviewed above differ in the degree to which they support 
the dominant health-oriented approach to the opioid crisis, with some narratives 
side-stepping the discussion, other narratives challenging the logic behind the 
health-oriented approach, and others embracing the approach. These narratives 
also vary in their depiction of persons with SUDs. Some narratives used by law 
enforcement to define the opioid crisis adhere to the traditional portrayal of the 
drug user as a deviant,108 some shift the blame to the drug traffickers,109 and 
others challenge the portrayal of the drug user as a deviant, recasting him instead 
as a person with an illness.110 Despite these differences, and their social justice 
implications, each of these narratives implicitly appoint the law enforcement 
lobby as “fixers” of the drug problem—fixers who are deserving of resource 
 
 105 See, e.g., Deadly Synthetic Drugs: The Need to Stay Ahead of the Poison Peddlers, 
supra note 102; The New Era in the Fight Against Methamphetamine in Iowa: Field Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2015) 1–2 (testimony of Steven F. 
Lukan, Director, Iowa Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy). 
 106 See Ohio Issue 1, supra note 11. 
 107 See generally David F. Musto, A Brief History of American Drug Control, 6 OAH 
MAG. HIST. 12 (1991). 
 108 See, e.g., Prescription Drug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note 2 (“[S]ignificant 
drug activity creates a generation of addicts who in turn sell drugs, steal property, rob and—
as a result of drug altered states, assault and kill—other citizens as part of a vicious cycle.”).  
 109 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 89–90. 
 110 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 93. 
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allocations to carry out their duties. These narratives define problem drug use in 
ways that increase the likelihood that law enforcement actors will be allocated 
a share of the appropriations set aside to address the opioid crisis. These 
narratives also refute the proposition that law enforcement groups are no longer 
needed to address drug use—a proposition that threatens the survival of criminal 
justice institutions by placing in jeopardy drug enforcement funding, which pays 
for salaries and needed resources.111  
The law enforcement narratives defining the opioid crisis could be ranked 
based on their effects on two primary factors: the degree to which the narrative 
depicts law enforcement agents as fixers of the problem (“degree of 
involvement”) and the amount of federal monies that would be needed to fund 
that particular degree of involvement. The ranking depicted in Figure 1, infra, 
begins with the narrative that supports the greatest degree of involvement and 
justifies the greatest degree of funding.112  
 
Figure 1: Relative Funding as a Function of Proposed Degree of Involvement 
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The typology of law enforcement narratives depicted in Figure 1 suggests 
that law enforcement groups envision their roles in addressing problem drug use 
as evolving—with some law enforcement groups clinging to the idea that they 
 
 111 See generally Patrick Murphy, Keeping Score: The Frailties of the Federal Drug 
Budget, RAND CORP. (1994), https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP138/index  
2.html [https://perma.cc/R7TE-YS2X] (explaining how drug enforcement budgets are 
calculated). 
 112 The level of funding needed is not an estimate of the amount of funding that would 
actually be needed. It is simply an ordinal ranking of predicted funding levels. 
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are the primary fixers and others willing to take more secondary roles as active 
actors within a health-oriented approach. Since budgets are often fixed and 
resources are scarce, it stands to reason that the greater the role a group has in 
fixing a problem, the greater allocation of resources they will receive. Based on 
this logic, groups seeking to further their members’ interests should, 
hypothetically, prefer narratives that depict their group as the primary fixer of 
the problem. As applied to problem drug use, this hypothesis would predict that 
the addict-as-a-deviant narrative would be the narrative most frequently used. 
However, I found that this narrative has fallen out of favor with law enforcement 
groups weighing in on the opioid crisis.113 I have yet to conduct an empirical 
analysis of variables that influenced this evolution of law enforcement 
narratives within drug policy, but the following theories may provide scholars 
with a useful starting point. 
It could be electorally costly for legislators to award benefits to groups that 
are viewed as greedy,114 or as sacrificing the public’s interest for its members’ 
financial gain.115 Therefore, for a narrative to motivate legislators to act, it 
should demonstrate how the benefits, or funding, awarded will be used to further 
the public’s best interest.116 The narrative should also resonate with and be 
believable to its intended audience of legislators and voting constituents.117 This 
suggests that for law enforcement groups to be successful they must consider 
widely held beliefs when deciding which amongst the available narratives to 
support. In districts or states where the perceived public opinion supports the 
explicit characterization of persons with SUDs as deviants, law enforcement 
groups will be rewarded for using the addict-as-a-deviant narrative—the 
narrative that awards law enforcement groups the greatest jurisdictional powers 
(and benefits)—with little political costs.  
Alternatively, for law enforcement groups concerned with the political 
consequences of vilifying overdose victims that are the sons and daughters of 
their voting constituents, the carrots-and-sticks narrative offers a suitable 
alternative. The carrots-and-sticks narrative acknowledges that persons with 
SUDs may be deserving of the opportunity to receive treatment, but also 
reinforces the need for the criminal justice system to ensure treatment 
adherence.118 Like the addict-as-a-deviant narrative, the carrots-and-sticks calls 
for control, power, and funding dollars to remain within the criminal justice 
system. Law enforcement groups that support this narrative may find that it 
addresses the frustration of family members who are unable to force their loved 
 
 113 El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 1359. 
 114 Anne Larason Schneider & Helen Ingram, POLICY DESIGN FOR DEMOCRACY 25 
(1997); see also VIRGINIA GRAY ET AL., INTEREST GROUPS AND HEALTH CARE REFORM 
ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 5–40 (Gerard W. Boychuk et al. eds., 2013).  
 115 Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram, Social Construction of Target Populations: 
Implications for Politics and Policy, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 334, 342–43 (1993). 
 116 El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 1362–63, 1369, 1380.  
 117 Id. at 1366.  
 118 See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 2. 
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one into treatment or who are unable to provide the familial support often 
needed to ensure treatment placement and completion. 
Law enforcement groups in districts or states where the idea that addiction-
as-a-disease is most accepted, however, may alienate voting constituents with 
the addict-as-a-deviant narrative or the carrots-and-sticks narrative for the 
reasons reviewed in the previous section.119 For these law enforcement groups, 
narratives that support the health-oriented approach, an approach aligned with 
the accepted addiction-as-a-disease causal story, may better position the law 
enforcement group and its elected or appointed leaders as allies to the public. 
Elected officials of these law enforcement groups may decide that supporting 
the health-oriented approach has electoral advantages and therefore be willing 
to take these electoral benefits over the additional funding that would come with 
a criminal justice approach.  
At this point, however, the theories in this section lack empirical or 
statistical proof. Each of the theories will need to be tested and additional 
empirical work will need to be conducted to determine the degree to which 
electoral considerations and shifts in public opinion influence the narratives 
used by law enforcement groups.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Like other organized interest groups, law enforcement groups take part in 
the problem definition discourse, during which they offer narratives that 
represent a social problem in a manner that best furthers the interest of their 
group members. For decades, the dominant narrative offered to Congress in 
support of legislative proposals to address problem drug use depicted the drug 
user as the deviant in need of punishment at the hands of law enforcement 
agencies.120 Given the benefits afforded to law enforcement in accordance with 
such a narrative, it is no surprise that some law enforcement groups preferred 
narratives of deviancy when taking part of the discourse on the opioid crisis.  
However, the legislative discourse has shifted, with both conservative and 
liberal legislators shying away from the “fire and brimstone” stories of evil and 
doom that once dominated the drug policy discourse. Their collective tone has 
softened. As such, some law enforcement groups’ continued and unwavering 
commitment to the stories of the past appear antiquated and out of touch with 
popular opinion. In localities that have been resistant to attempts to de-
stigmatize addiction and drug use, such a stance may not cause elected law 
enforcement officials to be concerned for their re-election. Conversely, these 
officials may be rewarded, electorally and financially, by constituents that 
continue to vilify drug users.  
Despite the persistence of the addict-as-deviant narrative at the margins, a 
majority of law enforcement groups that were active in the congressional public 
discourse have abandoned the express vilification of persons with SUDs. 
 
 119 Supra Part III. 
 120 See Musto, supra note 107 (providing a general history of federal drug enforcement).  
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Instead, some have embraced narratives that characterized drug traffickers as 
the bad guy, while others have gone so far as creating a new role for law 
enforcement actors within a more health-oriented response framework. This 
evolution of narratives suggests that the criminal justice groups’ traditional role 
as the ultimate fixers of problem drug use is being redefined in the policy 
discourse on the opioid crisis, at least by some law enforcement groups—despite 
this redefinition requiring law enforcement groups to relinquish some of their 
power over drug policy. Law enforcement groups willing to accept that such a 
redefinition is inevitable have re-envisioned their roles strategically so as to 
ensure that they are still fixers of sort. These groups redefined their own roles 
in ways that protected their interests—even painted themselves as heroes—as 
opposed to allowing other groups to relegate them as obsolete or to claim that 
they are part of the problem. If the definition of problem drug use as a health-
oriented issue is durable, then law enforcement groups that refuse to adjust their 
narratives to account for the shifts in the discourse risk becoming a drug policy 
anachronism, at best, or, at worst, as the new bad guys of the current drug policy 
reform narrative.  
